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The legal status of women has long been a recognized problem.
In the mid-nineteenth century the attention of feminists was focused
on the disadvantaged legal status of married women in their inability
to hold property and establish a legal identity. After the Civil War
the emphasis moved to suffrage and the plight of the exploited female
worker. In the 1960's, after a period of dormancy, the feminist move-
ment in law rallied around the standard of the Equal Rights Amend-
ment (ERA), which has as its ambitious goal the elimination of sex
discrimination in all areas of the law.
The ERA was approved by the United States Congress after
extensive hearings, and the process of state ratification was then
begun.' On February 7, 1974, the Ohio General Assembly ratified the
proposed 27th amendment to the United States Constitution, becom-
ing the 33rd state legislature to do so. 2 The amendment is as follows:
Section I. Equality of right under law shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex.
Section II. The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by ap-
propriate legislation, the provisions of this article.
Section III. This amendment shall have effect two years after the
date of ratification.3
* Assistant Attorneys General, State of Ohio, Civil Rights Section. The authors wish to
thank Arlene Lynch, legal intern, ERA Law Project, for her assistance in preparing this article.
I Joint Resolution of March 22, 1972, 86 Stat. 1523. The United States Senate passed the
ERA on March 22, 1972. 118 CONG. REC. 9598 (1972). The House of Representatives had
passed it on October 12, 1971. 117 CONG. REc. 35815 (1971).
2 135 S. JOUR. 1138 (1974). The thirty-two states that ratified the ERA prior to Ohio are
Alaska, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Ken-
tucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South
Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
North Dakota ratified after Ohio. Thirty-eight states are needed for national ratification.
3 H.R. JOUR. REs. 208, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974). The purpose of the amendment is to
make sex an impermissible factor in determining the legal rights of a citizen.
[Ulnder the Equal Rights Amendment the existence of. . . a characteristic or trait
to a greater degree in one sex does not justify classification by sex rather than by
the particular characteristic or trait. . . . [T]he law may make different rules for
some people than for others on the basis of the activity they are engaged in or the
function they perform. But the fact that in our present society members of one sex
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In Ohio the ERA was considered in the first six months of 1973.
The Governor and the Attorney General joined in support for ratifi-
cation. After some difficulty in a Senate committee, the ERA was
ratified on February 7, 1974.1
Shortly after ratification in Ohio, the Governor and the Attor-
ney General decided to push for implementation of the ERA princi-
ples in Ohio prior to national ratification. As part of this effort, they
formed a task force composed of twelve men and thirteen women,
who came from a variety of backgrounds. The Task Force met for
nine months and considered various portions of the Ohio Revised
Code.' They also considered various courses of affirmative action
which, though not mandated by the ERA, would in the opinion of
the Task Force remove gender-linked barriers and broaden lifestyle
options for Ohioans.' At the conclusion of the Task Force's work, the
are more likely to be found in a particular activity or to perform a particular function
does not allow the law to fix legal rights by virtue of membership in that sex. In short,
sex is a prohibited classification.
Brown, Emerson, Falk, and Freedman, The Equal Rights Amendment: A Constitutional Basis
for Equal Rights for Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871, 889 (1971) [hereinafter cited as BROWN]. (This
article was incorporated into the legislative history of the amendment at 118 CONG. REc. 4250
(1972)). Generally, the Amendment must be applied comprehensively with no exceptions. The
ERA does not permit administrative efficiency to be used as an exception, but does allow
differentiation between rights and responsibilities based on unique physical characteristics and
requirements of privacy; if the law differentiates according to characteristics exclusively unique
to women or exclusively unique to men, it does not violate the ERA. See id. at 893: Comment,
The Equal Rights Amendment: Its Meaning and Its Impact on Missouri Law, 39 Mo. L. REV.
553 (1974). Since the problem would arise only in the limited situations in which physical
characteristics are unique to one sex, the legislature would be limited to those narrow areas of
the law in which sex would play a role.
BALDWIN'S LEGIS. SERV., The Boxscore 20 (1974).
The Task Force was provided with an "OBAR" Lexis computer to study sections of the
Ohio Revised Code that might require revision to comply with the ERA. The computer study
was based on the use of 22 sex-linked search words like "male", "female", "father", or
"mother". The computer provided a list of over nine hundred sections containing these words.
The sections were then reviewed to determine whether they contained any inequities based on
sex.
The majority of the sections cited by the computer were deleted from the study at this
point. Some sections did not refer to humans. Other sections deleted used two or more sex-
specific words in conjunction, such as "mother or father" or "men and women", to obtain a
sexually neutral result. A third group of statutes used sex-specific words in traditionally
generic senses, such as reference to "drugs harmful to man" or to "man-hours" of labor. This
third group is sex-neutral, in effect, under the rules of construction set forth in OHIO REVISED
CODE § 1.43 (Page Supp. 1975). The remaining sections were referred to the Task Force for
consideration.
' See REPORT OF THE OHIO TASK FORCE FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EQUAl.
RIGHTS AMENDMENT Vi-vii (1975) [hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE REPORT]. It made several
recommendations for legislation, including the provision of child care services and the
decriminalization of prostitution.
These recommendations have become the basis of attack by ERA opponents who claim
the recommendations are mandated by ratification of the ERA. PHYLLIS SCHAFLY REPORT,
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Ohio Attorney General's Office set up an ERA project to coordinate
efforts, to determine priorities, and to draft and support legislation
implementing the Task Force recommendations.
Although the ERA itself has not yet become part of the United
States Constitution, it and the movement that formed around it has
had a significant effect on the legal status of Ohio men and women.
The impetus of the ERA ratification efforts alone has led the last two
legislatures to focus on several areas of the law and make significant
progress in dealing with sex discrimination. This article will discuss
a few of those areas.
I. SEX DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT, PUBLIC
ACCOMMODATIONS, AND HOUSING
In 1974 the General Assembly amended chapter 4112 of the
Revised Code,7 which prohibits discrimination in housing, public ac-
commodations, and employment on the basis of race, color, religion,
national origin, or ancestry, to include a similar prohibition against
sex discrimination by an employer in hiring, promotions, or the set-
tling of terms and conditions of employment.' The Act also prohibits
many practices of employment agencies, labor unions, apprentice
training programs, and job seekers that encourage or perpetuate sex
discrimination in employment.' It also made it unlawful for any pro-
prietor, employee, or manager in a place of public accommodation
Vol. 9, No. 5, p. I; Two Anti-ERA Women Displeased, New Hampshire Sunday News, Jan.
25, 1976. The ERA does not mandate that the state consider, as a policy matter, whether to
expend state funds in making child care more widely available to Ohio citizens. The ERA would
compel that any state government making a decision to increase child care facilities must do
so without regard to sex, making the facilities available to both mothers and fathers and to
male and female enrollees.
Similarly, the Task Force recommendation that prostitution be decriminalized is not
mandated by the ERA: "Although the ERA does not require a repeal of a neutrally worded
prositution law which is fairly enforced, it does require careful examination of any law which
is disproportionately enforced against women." TASK FORCE REPORT, supra at 43. The Ohio
prostitution statute is sex-neutral and can be applied to both prostitute and customer. However,
the female prostitute is punished more frequently and harshly than a male customer. The
language of the statute withstands an ERA analysis, but the enforcement practices may not
withstand a "strict scrutiny" challenge.
The decriminalization recommendation was based on the Task Force's determination that
consensual behavior of adults that does not harm others should not be infringed without a
compelling state interest. In the opinion of the Task Force, no such interest is apparent in the
area of prostitution. Id. at 43.
' Am. Sub. H.B. 610, codified at OHio REV. CODE ANN. ch. 4112 (1973), as amended
(Page Supp. 1975).
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.02(A) (Page Supp. 1975). For a further explanation of
this section's meaning, see the EEOC Guidelines on Sex Discrimination in Employment, 29
C.F.R. § 1604 (1975), which interpret the substantially identical federal law.
' OHiO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.02(B)-(F) (Page Supp. 1975).
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to deny any person the full advantages of the accommodations, facili-
ties, and privileges of the facility because of sex.'" Discrimination in
housing, including sales, rentals, and financing, is also banned."
The inclusion of the prohibition against sex discrimination also
effected a repeal of other sections of the Ohio Revised Code which
were in conflict with the mandate of amended chapter 4112. In Jones
Metal Products Co. v. Walker, the Ohio Supreme Court held that
the "female protective labor laws" were in conflict with the anti-sex
discrimination provisions of Title VII (which are nearly identical to
the Ohio provisions). These protective laws prohibited women from
working in certain professions, 3 or from being employed in jobs that
require heavy lifting or overtime work, 4 and required employers to
provide certain benefits to female employees.15 The court indicated
that these sections have been used to discriminate against women by
restricting their employment opportunities." They also had a discrim-
inatory impact on male employees who were not provided with equal
benefits.' 7 The new amendments provide that laws inconsistent with
any provision of chapter 4112 are rendered inapplicable by that chap-
ter. 8 Therefore, the inclusion of the sex discrimination prohibition in
chapter 4112 makes the "female protective labor laws" inapplicable
to all employers covered by that chapter, i.e. those with four or more
employees.
The prohibitions of chapter 4112 concerning sex discrimination
are very similar to the federal anti-discrimination laws in the areas
of employment and housing. However, the federal agencies enforcing
these provisions are required to refer allegations of discrimination to
the state agency and to defer any action on them for a period of 30
10 Id. § 4112.02(G).
1 Id. § 4112.02(H).
11 29 Ohio St. 2d 173, 281 N.E.2d 1 (1972).
13 Omo R.v. CODE ANN. § 4107.43 (Page 1973) prohibited the employment of women
in occupations including crossing watchman, gas or electric meter reader, in delivery service
on motor vehicles over one ton capacity, in baggage handling, freight handling, or mining.
" Id. This section prohibited the employment of women in occupations requiring frequent
or repeated lifting of weights over 25 pounds. Id. § 4107.46 limited the employment of women
for more than 48 hours a week or eight hours a day, or more than six days a week, subject to
exceptions.
11 Id. § 4107.42 required employers to provide female workers with seats for use when not
actively engaged in work, a lunch room and a 30-minute lunch break. Id. § 4107.46 required
that a meal break be provided after five hours of work.
" 29 Ohio St. 2d at 177-78,281 N.E.2d at 6. See also EEOC Guidelines to Sex Discrimina-
tion in Employment, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2 (1975).
11 See EEOC Guidelines to Sex Discrimination in Employment, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(b)(4)
(1975).
" OHIo REV. CODE ANN, § 4112.08 (Page Supp. 1975).
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or 60 days. This deferral procedure allows the state rather than the
federal government the first opportunity to remedy the situation. 20
The creation of a state remedy for sex discrimination makes the
enforcement agencies more accessible to Ohio citizens wishing to
obtain information or to file a complaint.21 Potential complainants
may also prefer the state procedure because the Ohio Civil Rights
Commission's administrative procedure eliminates the need for re-
taining private counsel in the vast majority of cases.22
The prohibition of sex discrimination under Title VII of the 1964
Civil Rights Act was applicable only to employers with more than
15 employees.2? Thus prior to House Bill 610 employees of small
business were not covered. However, under the new enactment, pro-
tection is afforded to all employees working for firms with four or
more employees.24
The amendment also afforded victims of sex discrimination in
public accommodations a legal remedy for the first time.21
Since January 1, 1974, when the new law took effect, sex dis-
crimination has become the second most frequently complained of
form of discrimination filed with the Ohio Civil Rights Commis-
sion.26 Complaints have been filed by both men and women and have
alleged discrimination in all three areas: employment, public accom-
modation, and housing.2Y
19 The prohibition against sex discrimination in housing requires a 30-day deferral
period. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3c (1970). The prohibition against employment discrimination
requires a 60-day deferral period. Id. § 2000e-5c.
1 For further discussion of the advantages of this procedure, see Murray & Eastwood,
Jane Crow and the Law: Sex Discrimination and Title VII, 34 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 232 (1965);
State Legislative Response to the Federal Civil Rights Act: A Proposal, 9 UTAH L. REV. 434
(1964); THE UNIFORM ANTI-DISCRIMINATION AcT, Comment to § 301 (1966).
21 The Ohio Civil Rights Commission has six regional offices located in Cleveland, Colum-
bus, Toledo, Cincinnati, Akron, and Dayton.
'2 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.05(B) (Page Supp. 1975) provides that the Attorney
General shall present the evidence in support of the complaint at the administrative hearing.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (Supp. IV, 1974).
24 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.01(B) (Page Supp. 1975).
42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1970), which prohibits racial, color, national origin, and religious
discrimination, does not include a prohibition against sex discrimination. The courts have
declined to extend its coverage to include this type of discrimination. Seidenberg v. McSorley's
Old Ale House, Inc., 308 F. Supp. 1253 (S.D. N.Y. 1969); Decrow v. Hotel Syracuse Corp.,
288 F. Supp. 530 (N.D. N.Y. 1968).
21 Only allegations of race discrimination are more common. From December 1973 to
June 1974, 680 allegations of sex discrimination were filed with the Ohio Civil Rights Commis-
sion. In fiscal year 1974-75, 1548 of the 5594 complaints filed were on the basis of sex. From
July 1975 to December 1975, 682 of the 2500 complaints were on that basis.
" Approximately 95 percent of the sex allegations are based on employment discrimina-
tion, three percent on public accommodation discrimination, and 1.6 percent on housing dis-
crimination.
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II. DIVORCE REFORM
In June of 1974 the Ohio legislature enacted the first major
revision in Ohio divorce law in the past century by passing House Bill
233.1 The most significant changes effected by the Divorce Reform
Act concern the grounds for and defenses to divorce. It abolished the
defense of recrimination, which required the party seeking divorce to
be free of fault, and also the defense of condonation, which inferred
forgiveness of prior misconduct from reconciliation of the parties and
barred use of that misconduct as evidence. 9 The Act also established
two forms of no-fault divorce. A divorce may now be obtained when
the parties have lived apart for two years without cohabitation or
interruption °.3  The second no-fault form, dissolution of marriage,
can be obtained when the parties agree to the divorce, to a division
of property, and, if there are minor children of the marriage, to the
terms of custody, visitation rights, child support, and alimony.3'
The Divorce Reform Act also made important revisions in the
areas of alimony, custody of minor children, child support, and rec-
onciliation .3  The bill expands the specific criteria for determining
whether alimony is necessary, the amount, and the manner of pay-
ment. 13 The previous law allowed the court to order alimony as it
deemed reasonable to either party; in determining the reasonableness
of an award, the court was required to consider the property each
brought to the marriage, their earning capacities, and the value of the
real and personal property owned by each at the time of the di-
2a Am. Sub. H.B. 233, 1 10th Gen. Ass'y. For a comprehensive history of divorce law in
Ohio, see REFERENCE MANUAL FOR CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION PROGRAM PUBLICATION
No. 89, DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE 1.01 (1974) [hereinafter cited as DISSOLUTION OF
MARRIAGE].
29 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3105.10(B) (Page Supp. 1975). These defenses were derived
from the common law. See, e.g., Karpanty v. Karpanty, 39 Ohio App. 194, 177 N.E. 521 (1926)
(recrimination); Opperman v. Opperman, 77 Ohio App. 69, 65 N.E.2d 655 (1945) (recrimi-
nation); Wilson v. Wilson, 14 Ohio App. 2d 148, 237 N.E.2d 421 (1968) (condonation); Huf-
fine v. Huffine, 36 Ohio Op. 56, 74 N.E.2d 764 (C.P. Van Wert Cty. 1974) (condonation).
11 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3105.63 (Page Supp. 1975). Four years separation is required
if one party is confined to a mental hospital.
31 Id. § 3105.61.
32 The original bill also contained a requirement that a course on family living be a
prerequisite for high school graduation. However, this provision was deleted prior to enactment.
The Ohio ERA Task Force made a recommendation of a similar nature. TASK FORCE REPORT.
supra note 6, at 8.
' OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3105.18 (Page Supp. 1975). Very few divorced women
actually receive alimony. Even when they do receive an alimony award, it is extremely hard to
enforce. See CITIZEN'S ADVISORY COUNCIL ON STATUS OF WOMEN, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,
THE EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT AND ALIMONY AND CHILD SUPPORT LAWS (1972) Blank and
Pone, Enforcement of Interspousal Support Obligations: A Proposal, 2 WOMEN'S RIGHTS L.
REv., June 1975, at 17; Marvin A. Freeman, Should Spousal Support Be Abolished? 48 Los
ANGELES B. BULL. 236 (1973).
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vorce.34 The new law expands the criteria to be considered to eleven
factors, 5 two of which are of special interest to women. One subsec-
tion provides that the court may consider whether custody of minor
children of the marriage might render it inappropriate for the guard-
ian to seek employment outside the home. 6 Although sex-neutral in
form, this will primarily benefit mothers. The other subsection
requires the court to consider the contributions of the spouse as a
homemaker. 38 This allows for a more equitable division of marital
property by requiring the court to consider the contributions of the
homemaking spouse to the financial success of the marriage,9 a
break from the long tradition of ignoring the economic value of
homemaking services.40
The statute is sex-neutral and, like its predecessor, provides ei-
ther spouse with the opportunity for alimony. 41 It is interesting to
note that, while the factors listed are not all inclusive, the husband's
primary obligation of support, codified in Revised Code § 3103.03,42
is not listed as one of the factors to be considered. A recent Ohio case
construing child support provisions of this bill found the absence of
such a provision significant and held that § 3103.03 will not be en-
forced by direct means during an ongoing marriage,43 making this
discriminatory provision inapplicable for all practical purposes.4 4 The
Former OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3105.18 (Page 1972).
s The factors to be considered are (1) the relative earning abilities of the parties,
(2) their ages, physical and emotional conditions, (3) their retirement benefits, (4) their ex-
pectancies and inheritances, (5) the duration of the marriage, (6) the extent to which it would
be inappropriate for the party to seek employment outside the home because he is custodian
of the children, (7) the parties' standard of living during the marriage, (8) their education,
(9) their assets and liabilities, (10) the property brought to the marriage, and (I1) the contri-
butions of a spouse as homemaker. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3105.18(B) (Page Supp. 1975).
Id. § 3105.18(B)(6).
See DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE, supra note 28, at 4.06.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3105.18(B)(! 1) (Page Supp. 1975).
' See DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE, supra note 28, at 4.08-.09. See also UNIFORM MAR-
RIAGE AND DIVORCE AcT § 308.
" See Krauskopf and Thomas, Partnership Marriage: The Solution to an Ineffective and
Inequitable Law of Support, 35 OHIO STATE L.J. 558, 580-84 (1974).
4' See Hickle v. Hickle, 6 Ohio C.C.R. 490 (Cir. Ct. App. 1892).
n OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3103.03 (Page Supp. 1975) provides in part: "The husband
must support himself, his wife, and his children out of his property or by his labor. If he is
unable to do so, the wife must assist him so far as she is able."
1 Hill v. Hill, 40 Ohio App. 2d 1, 317 N.E.2d 250 (1973).
" Traditionally, courts have refused to order support in an ongoing marriage because of
reluctance to become involved in the internal works of a marriage and fear that it would
encourage divorce. See McGuire v. McGuire, 157 Neb. 226,59 N.W.2d 336 (1953): L. KANOW-
ITZ, WOMEN AND THE LAW 71 (1969); Krauskopf, supra note 40, at 563; Cozier, Marital
Support, 15 B.U.L. REV. 28, 33 (1935). The Divorce Reform Act allows the court to award
alimony while the parties are residing together. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3105.17 (Page Supp.
1975). However, it is the intent of the Act's sponsors that this should be used only when divorce
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Ohio spouse support laws, therefore, are in substantial compliance
with the ERA.15
The Divorce Reform Act also repealed Revised Code
§ 3103.02,46 which provided that the husband was the head of the
household and could choose any reasonable abode and manner of
living, and required that the wife must conform to his decision. The
failure of the wife to remain at her husband's abode could result in a
finding of gross neglect of marital duty and could, in effect, create a
ground for divorce.47 This provision was objectionable for a number
of reasons. It impeded a wife's ability to establish her own domicile
during an ongoing marriage (although she could establish her own
domicile for purposes of divorce jurisdiction and venue"). The wife's
inability to establish a separate domicile during marriage led to many
hardships, including loss of in-state tuition status at state universities
and difficulties with voter registration.49 This section also reinforced
the justification given by courts for their failure to accord the wife in
an ongoing marriage a direct action for support against her husband
for anything more than subsistence." Finally, to the extent the statute
codified social and religious traditions concerning family structure,
this may have been an unconstitutional and inappropriate action for
the state to take.5t The repeal of § 3103.02 must therefore be viewed
as a positive step toward equality for marriage partners.
There has been some suggestion that § 3103.04,52 which sets forth
more explicit criteria for the determination of custody, would pre-
clude the application of a presumption that the mother was the natu-
ral, and therefore the best guardian of young children.53 However,
is contemplated. See Norris, Divorce Reform, Ohio Style, 48 OHIO BAR 1031, 1035 (1974).
11 The model act after which the Ohio revision was fashioned should be found to be in
conformity with the ERA. Brown, supra note 3, at 952; TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 6, at
4.
46 Former OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3103.02 (Page 1972).
' See Slusser v. Slusser, 68 Ohio L. Abs. 7, 121 N.E.2d 317 (Ct. App. 1952).
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3105.04 (Page 1972).
' For further discussion of the domicile difficulties such statutes have caused, see L.
KANOWITZ, WOMEN AND THE LAW 46 (1969); Brown, supra note 3, at 941.
" The husband, pursuant to such provisions, can determine the standard of living and is
obligated to support the family only to that extent. An example of the effect of this rule is
McGuire v. McGuire, 157 Neb. 226, 59 N.W.2d 336 (1953); although the husband was worth
$1,000,000 he was not obliged to provide his wife a home with indoor plumbing or a central
heating system or to provide her with money for charitable contributions. See also Krauskopf,
supra note 40, at 564-65.
11 The first amendment prohibits the establishment of religion by the state. The "penum-
bral" right of privacy protects the intramarital relationship. See. e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479 (1965); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S.
438 (1972).
52 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3103.04 (Page Supp. 1975).
Norris, supra note 44, at 1035.
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since 1893 the statutes of Ohio have placed the husband and wife,
when divorced or separated, on equal footing in seeking the "care,
custody and control" of children of the marriage;54 the "tender years
doctrine" that favored the mother as custodian of young children has
never been controlling in Ohio." Thus the concern is unfounded that
§ 3109.04 would change any presumptions; if the courts have in fact
applied such a preference, it has been without statutory or binding
case-law authority.56
III. CREDIT
The use of credit has become a way of life in Ohio. Credit is the
means to obtain housing, education, and transportation, to establish
a business, and to achieve many other personal goals. It is well docu-
mented that women have frequently been excluded or hampered from
participating fully in an economic system that depends upon credit.'
The I llth General Assembly acted to deal with discrimination in
credit by enacting House Bill 151. s
The difficulties encountered by persons in obtaining and using
credit have been the subject of intensive study, and the recognition
of these problems has, on the federal level, resulted in the passage of
the Equal Credit Opportunity Act. 9 The studies indicate that credit
problems do exist for women, primarily those who are married, di-
vorced, or widowed."0 The major barriers are that: (1) women have
more trouble obtaining credit and retaining credit with the same
terms and conditions as men; (2) creditors are often unwilling to
extend credit to married women in their own names; (3) creditors
often discount a portion of a couple's income in considering a mort-
gage; and (4) the creation or revival of a credit identity is more diffi-
cult for divorced women and widows.
The central substantive provision of House Bill 151 prohibits
discrimination in the granting, withholding, extending, or renewing
of credit, or in the fixing of terms of any form of credit, on the basis
" OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.03 (Page 1972). The original provision is found at 90
Ohio Laws 186 (1893).
" See Woodruff v. Woodruff, 7 Ohio Misc. 87 (C.P. Miami Cty. 1965).
a See Norris, supra note 44, at 105.
11 Hearings Before the Joint Economic Committee of the Congress of the United States
on the Economic Problems of Women, 93rd Congress, Ist Sess. 191 (1973): GOVERNOR'S TASK
FORCE ON CREDIT FOR WOMEN, SHE SUPPORTS HER CHILDREN (1974) [hereinafter cited as
CREDIT TASK FORCE]; Comment, Women and Credit, 12 DUQ. L. REV. 863 (1974).
" Am. Sub. H.B. 151, 111th Gen. Ass'y, codified at OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 4112.02-
.05 (Page Supp. 1975).
,9 15 U.S.C.A. § 1691-1691e (Supp. 1976).
" CREDIT TASK FORCE, supra note 57, at 13.
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of race, color, religion, sex, marital status, national origin, or ances-
try."' This broad prohibition against discrimination applies to almost
every type of credit transaction, since "creditor" is defined to include
any person who regularly extends, renews, or continues credit, any
person who regularly arranges for the extension, renewal, or contin-
uation of credit, or any assignee of an original creditor who partici-
pates in the decision to extend, renew, or continue credit, whether
or not any interest or finance charge is required. 2
In addition to the general prohibition against discrimination, the
new law deals specifically with several problems delineated by the
Credit Task Force. For instance, single females are sometimes asked
to provide co-obligors when a male would not be so required. 3 One
survey indicated that eighty-six percent of the commercial banks
replying to the questionnaire asked fathers to co-sign for loans to
unmarried daughters." Although most of the retail institutions
replying required that a wife supply financial information on her
husband, only twenty-six percent required similar information of a
husband concerning his wife. 5 Under Ohio law the imposition of
special requirements or conditions, such as requiring co-obligors or
reapplication because of the applicant's sex or a change in a person's
marital status, is now prohibited."6
Creditors have also discriminated against women by requiring
that they obtain credit under their husband's surname, even though
the wife may never have adopted the use of the name upon marriage."
House Bill 151 expressly states that it is discriminatory to "[r]efuse
to grant credit to an individual in any name that individual customar-
ily uses, if it has been determined in the normal course of business,
that the creditor will grant credit to the individual."6
The widespread practice of discounting a portion of a couple's
income in a mortgage application because the wife may be of child-
bearing age is also prohibited by House Bill 151. The creditor may
not "[r]efuse to consider without prejudice the combined income of
both husband and wife for the purpose of extending mortgage credit
to a married couple or either member thereof." 9 The statute also has
, OfIo REv. CODE ANN. § 4112.021(B)(I)(a) (Page Supp. 1975).
2 d. § 4112.021(A)(2).
'3 See CREDIT TASK FORCE, supra note 57, at 13.
', Id. at 38.
I ld. at 31.
OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 4112.021(B)(I)(e) (Page Supp. 1975).
" See Hearings Before the Joint Economic Committee. supra note 57, at 204: CREDIT
TASK FORCE, supra note 57, at 13.
" OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 4112.021(B)(I)(d) (Page Supp. 1975) (emphasis added).
69 Id. § 4112.02(H)(6).
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language that should prohibit the practice of discounting income in
credit transactions other than mortgages, since it is a discriminatory
practice to "[r]efuse to consider the sources of income of an applicant
for credit, or disregard or ignore the income of an applicant, in whole
or in part, on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, marital status,
national origin, or ancestry."7
This industry practice of discounting income is tied to the sex
of the applicant, since the basis for discounting is that a woman may
have a child. The impact of a working wife's ability to have a child
on her ability to repay a loan has been exaggerated by the industry
because of the unfounded assumptions that the wife's employment is
temporary and that when she has a child she will discontinue her
employment. These assumptions ignore the increasing employment
of women and the tendency to return to work under liberalized ma-
ternity leave policies. Studies indicate that loans to families whose
entire income is earned by the husband have a slightly higher delin-
quency rate than loans to families in which the husband's income is
only a portion of the family income.7 In addition, a 35 year-old
married woman entering the labor force after her last child will work
an average of 24 more years.71
Since credit is normally extended in the husband's name, and the
wife's credit history is kept as a part of the husband's file rather than
in a file of her own, one of the most severe credit problems for
divorced women and widows is re-creating a credit identity once a
man is no longer a part of the woman's credit picture. This problem
is highlighted by Credit Task Force testimony of cases in which a
woman's account with a credit card company was abruptly termi-
nated due to her husband's death, even though bills had continued to
be paid and the woman had qualified for credit in her own right.73
Over ninety percent of the credit bureaus responding to a survey
indicated that upon marriage a woman's credit history was put into
a joint file; yet over sixty percent of the same institutions indicated
that if a divorced woman applied for credit and did not have her own
file, the credit bureau did not furnish an inquiring creditor with in-
formation in her husband's file.7
The new law attacks these problems by providing that it is un-
lawful for a creditor to
7- Id. § 4112.021(B)(I)(c).
'1 L. KENDALL, ANATOMY OF THE RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE (1964). For a discussion of
this study, see WOMEN AND CREDIT, supra note 57, at 873.
72 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, WOMEN'S BUREAU OF EMPLOYMENT STAN-
DARDS, WORKING WOMEN 4 (rev. 1973).
CREDIT TASK FORCE, supra note 57, at 15.
i Id. at 45.
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[flail to refuse to print on each application for credit, in at least ten
point type, the following notice: "IF YOU ARE MARRIED, you
may apply for either joint or individual credit. You also have the
right to request that the credit bureau maintain separate credit
histories on you and your spouse.""
It is also an unlawful discriminatory practice for a credit reporting
agency to "[flail or refuse on the basis of race, color, religion, sex,
marital status, national origin, or ancestry to maintain, upon the
request of the individual, a separate file on each individual to whom
credit is extended or about whom information is assembled or evalu-
ated. ' '76 Consequently, if women take the time to require the credit
bureau to separate their credit histories from those of their husband's,
many of the problems of women who find themselves without a credit
history upon widowhood or divorce will be alleviated.
IV. RAPE
For too long, emphasis has been placed on the actions of the rape
victim rather than those of the rapist. Society has tended to label the
victim as the one to blame because of her77 supposed "improper
behavior." As a consequence, women have been forced to take exces-
sive precautions in conducting their daily activities. Despite such pre-
cautions, F.B.I. reports indicate an astounding increase in the num-
ber of forcible rapes both on and off the streets.7 8 At the same time,
less than fourteen percent of reported rape offenses79 result in suc-
cessful prosecutions.8 One reason for this failure to convict is the in-
adequacy of existing laws and the strict evidentiary requirements.8t
"' OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.021(B)(l)(g) (Page Supp. 1975).
78 Id. § 4112.02 1(b)(2)(a).
7 The authors wish to take a realistic view of the fact that a majority of rape victims are
women.
11 F.B.I., UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS FOR THE UNITED STATES (1974 Preliminary Annual
Release, March 31, 1975). Forcible rape increased nine percent in 1974.
7, F.B.I. criminologists estimate that only one out of ten forcible rapes is even reported.
Id.
Id. at 15.
" See 120 CONG. REC. H7460 (daily ed. July 31, 1974). Rep. Abzug remarked that:
"No other group of victims are so often disbelieved as women who have been raped.
During the 1960's, the incidence of reported rape rose over 65 percent, while in this
period the number of convictions for rape rose only 36 percent. Indeed, only 13.3
percent of those men tried for rape were convicted in 1972, the lowest conviction rate
for any violent crime. One reason convictions for rape are so low is the stringent
corroborative evidence requirements. In the courtroom, the victim often must pub-
licly testify as to her past sexual relationships. The offender does not have to testify
at all since he cannot be forced to incriminate himself. Moreover, his past behavior
and even prior rape convictions are not admissible as evidence."
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However, Senate Bill 144,2 recently passed by the Ohio General
Assembly, attempts to reverse this trend.
Major difficulties have evolved in the investigation, prosecution,
and disposition of rape cases. Some of the more troublesome prob-
lems are that: (1) the psychological impact of the rape may make the
victim reluctant to testify; (2) the publicizing of details of the trial
tends to damage the reputation of the victim; (3) the reputation of
the victim for other sexual activity can be attacked; (4) the victim
must assume the costs of evidence-gathering for the state prosecution;
(5) the victim must prove resistance; (6) no legal protection is avail-
able for legally separated spouses; (7) a minor who is a rape victim
has no right to a medical examination without parental consent; and
(8) the penalties for convicted rapists are unrealistic for today's so-
ciety. The Ohio legislature has tried to remedy some of these prob-
lems.
To protect the victim's reputation, a new provision requires the
court, upon request, to suppress the names of the victim and the
offender, as well as the details of the alleged offense, until the prelimi-
nary hearing, arraignment, or the dismissal of the charge or other
conclusion of the case, whichever occurs first.8"
The most extensive changes in the Ohio statute are those con-
cerning rules of evidence. Historically, evidence of the victim's repu-
tation for unchastity was admissible to impeach credibility and to
show the probability of the victim's consent.84 Application of these
rules of evidence had the effect of placing the victim on trial rather
than the offender." In order to combat this, the evidentiary rules were
amended to prohibit, in prosecutions for rape, the introduction of any
type of evidence of the victim's past sexual activity in order to show
probability of consent.86 Exceptions were made for evidence pertain-
ing to the origin of semen, pregnancy, or disease and evidence of the
victim's past sexual activity with the offender. Evidence is admissible
under these exceptions, however, only if the court, at a hearing in
"2 Am. Sub. S.B. 144, amending OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2907.01, 2907.02, 2907.05,
and 2951.02, enacting §§ 2907.10, 2907.11, 2907.12, 2907.28, and 2907.29 (Page Supp. 1975).
It became effective Aug. 27, 1975, upon signature of the Governor. Two other states have
enacted similar provisions. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 750.1-.568 (Supp. 1975); CAL. EVID.
CODE ANN. §§ 782, 1103 (West Supp. 1975); CAL. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 13961.5 (West Supp.
1975); CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 127d-27e (West Supp. 1975).
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.11 (Page Supp. 1975).
See Note, Rape Reform Legislation: Is It The Solution?, 24 CLEVE. Sr. L. Rrv. 463,
478 (1975). Some respected legal authorities have suggested admitting evidence of prior specific
acts. See, e.g., B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 156-57 (1921): 3 J.
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 200 (3d ed. 1940).
" See Note, Rape Reform Legislation, supra note 84, at 488.
14 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.02(D) (Page Supp. 1975).
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chambers, determines that such evidence is "material to a fact at
issue in the case and that its inflammatory or prejudicial nature does
not outweigh its probative value." 87 At this hearing, or any hearing
or proceeding to decide the admissibility of evidence, the victim may
be represented by independent counsel. In the case of indigency or
inability to obtain counsel, the court may upon request appoint coun-
sel without cost to the victim."8 This provision is the first of its kind
in the country, and it is a major step in providing due process for the
rape victim.
The need to prove physical resistance by the victim is also elimi-
nated by this statute. 9 This eliminates the confusion that results from
trying to apply a resistance standard.
A feature unique to the crime of rape is that substantial evidence
must be obtained by physical examination of the victim.9" Although
this evidence is used by the prosecution in its case, the costs of the
examination have usually been borne by the victim. Ohio is one of
four states' that have enacted legislation under which the county or
municipality (whichever has jurisdiction) must assume the costs of the
evidence-gathering examination. 2 The Ohio provision also requires
that each reported victim be informed of other medical and psychiat-
ric services. 3 Ohio is also unique in allowing a medical examination,
even without prior parental consent, of a minor who is a victim of
rape.94
K' Id.
Id. § 2907.02(F).
'9 Id. § 2907.02(C).
See Note, Rape Reform Legislation, supra note 84, at 494.
, CAL. GOV'T CODE § 13961.5 (West Supp. 1975): ch. 374, § 11, [1975] Minn. Laws 1251:
ch. 600. § 8, [1975] Nev. Laws 1131, 1133; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.28 (Page Supp. 1975).
,1 The home rule provision, OHIO CONST. art. XVIII, §§ 3, 7, may require the passage of
an ordinance or bill of appropriations in order to have the costs of this examination shouldered
by a political subdivision. If this is true, the state is without authority to force a municipality
to bear the costs of this evidence-gathering examination. The home rule provision does not.
however, impede the possibility of imposing the costs on counties.
Compensation for damages to a victim of rape may also be recoverable under the recently
enacted Victim Compensation Act, H.B. 82, 11Ith Gen. Ass'y, 4 PAGE'S LEGISLATIVE BULL..
363 (1976). The Act provides for compensation by the state for specified economic losses to
"physically injured" victims of criminal action. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.51. The list of
specified losses that are recoverable includes "reasonable charges incurred for reasonably
needed products, services, and accomodations, including those for medical care, rehabilitation,
rehabilitative occupational training, and other remedial treatment and care." Id. § 2743.51().
This "award of reparations" is allowed only to the extent that compensation is not "readily
available" from some other source (such as the county in the case of evidence-gathering expen-
ses). Id. §§ 2743.5 1(B), 2743.60(D). The maximum sum recoverable under the Act is $50,000.
Id. § 2743.60(E).
11 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.29 (Page Supp. 1975).
91 Id.
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"Spouse" has been redefined by to the Act to include one pres-
ently married to an offender at the time of the alleged offense except:
(1) when parties have entered into a written separation agreement
pursuant to § 3103.06 of the Revised Code; (2) during the pendency
of an action for annulment, divorce, dissolution of marriage, or ali-
mony; (3) in an action for alimony, after the effective date of judg-
ment." This definition affords legal protection for those who intend
to terminate the marriage, without disturbing the viable, ongoing
marital relationship.
Additionally, Ohio's new statute has added the offense of "sex-
ual penetration." This is defined as the insertion by any person "with-
out privilege to do so . . . [of] any instrument, apparatus, or other
object into the vaginal or anal cavity of another, not the spouse of
the offender" when the offender compels submission by force or
threat of force, or when the offender prevents resistance by adminis-
tering a drug or intoxicant by force, or threat of force, or when the
other person is lesg than thirteen years of age. One convicted is
guilty of a first degree felony (punishable as first degree rape). 7 This
provides legal protection against homosexual as well as heterosexual
rape and thereby increases the equal protection of the laws as guaran-
teed by the fourteenth amendment. 8
Traditionally, sentences have been harsh for those convicted of
rape, because of the mistaken belief that heavy penalties would deter
future crimes." Yet the harshness of the penalties has tended to make
juries reluctant to convict.1 Notwithstanding this tendency, the Gen-
eral Assembly has provided for a sentence of five years of incarcera-
tion for rape or felonious sexual penetration with a second or subse-
quent offense; if the victim is under 13 years of age, the incarceration
for a second offender is extended to ten years.10' The statute further
provides that one convicted of rape, whether for a first or subsequent
offense, is not eligible for suspension of sentence, probation, or pa-
role. 10 2 If the crime is felonious sexual penetration of a victim under
13, life imprisonment is imposed even if it is a first offense. 03
The General Assembly should be commended for its rape reform
Is Id. § 2907.01(L).
"1 Id. § 2907.12(A).
7 Id. § 2907.12(B).
" See Comment, Ohios New Rape Law: Does It Protect Complainant at the Expense of
the Rights of the Accused?, 9 AKRON L. REv. 337, 341 (1975).
" Cf Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 458-59 (1972) (Powell, J., dissenting).
, See Note, Rape Reform Legislation. supra note 84, at 491.
OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.10(A) (Page Supp. 1975).
11 Id. § 2907.12(B).
i Id. § 2907.10(B).
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legislation. Certainly the changes are noteworthy and make Ohio a
leader in providing due process and equal protection for the victim
as well as the accused.
However, there are certain problems yet unsolved. Section
2907.02(D) does not restrict the right of either the victim or the
defendant to introduce evidence to impeach credibility, although it
disallows its introduction for the purpose of proving the substantive
element of consent. Hence the defense can introduce evidence that is
irrelevant to the issues of the case in order to attack the victim's
credibility. In rape cases, this evidence may often be inflammatory
and highly prejudicial.
In the area of medical examinations for minors who are rape
victims, § 2907.28 does not require prior consent of the parents or
guardian but does provide for notice to the parents after the examina-
tion has occurred. This may keep some minors away from the treat-
ment they require.
In the area of sentencing and parole there are some unexplained
inconsistencies. One who rapes a child with an object, even if it is a
first offense, is automatically sentenced to life imprisonment, al-
though there is the possibility of parole; on the other hand, one who
rapes a child with his sex organ, regardless of the number of times,
receives a nonprobation sentence of 10 years. An equitable re-
examination of these penalties is in order.
Finally, further measures ought to be taken to prevent forcible
rapes. Greater police protection should be made available in those
areas with high incidents of rape offenses. The public must be in-
structed in the best means of preventing rapes and in various tactics
of self-defense in order to discourage future crimes.
V. THE PROBATE REFORM ACT
Ohio probate law has recently undergone major and long-needed
revisions. Initially there was considerable indecision about the form
the revision should take. The Uniform Probate Code, promulgated
in 1969, had many proponents and opponents.' 0' During the 10th
General Assembly, each house passed a reform bill, but neither be-
came law because the conference committee failed to resolve the
differences between the House and Senate versions.0 5 The 111 th Gen-
"'1 For a discussion of the need for reform and of the positions of the Uniform Probate
Code's proponents and opponents, see Kaufman, Probate Reform: Old Dog, New Tricks. I
OHIO N.L. REv. 427 (1974).
" Six probate reform bills were introduced in the 110th General Assembly, four of which
would have enacted the UNIFORM PROBATE COoE. Am. Sub. H.B. 996, a compromise bill, was
enacted by both houses.
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eral Assembly, building upon the work of its predecessors, enacted
Senate Bill 145.106 The Probate Reform Act simplified and expedited
proceedings, facilitated administration, and brought the Code into
conformity with the rules of civil and appellate procedure. Other
changes in the Code emphasized the duties of the probate court and
of fiduciaries. It gave the surviving spouse a larger share of the estate
of the deceased intestate, eliminated the vestiges of distinctions be-
tween ancestral and nonancestral property, and eliminated many dis-
tinctions based upon sex.0 7
The expansion of the "widow allowance" to a sex-neutral allow-
ance for support was a major reform of the Act. Formerly, Revised
Code § 2117.20 provided for an allowance to the widow and minor
children sufficient for twelve months' support.' Every widow was
entitled to this allowance irrespective of her personal resources. No
widower was entitled to an allowance."9 The allowance was available
to children if it was necessary for their support, "taking into consider-
ation the father's primary duty to care for his children."" 0 Therefore,
the children of a female deceased could obtain an allowance only if
the father was unable to support them for a year. Thus the sex of the
deceased was a crucial factor in determining the availability of the
allowance to the survivors.
When this provision was originally enacted,' very few women
worked outside the home and employment opportunities were very
limited. The death of the male breadwinner was a serious financial
as well as personal hardship. Consequently, the assumption of the
wife's dependency which underlies this section was appropriate. Due
" Am. Sub. S.B. 145, 11 Ith Ohio Gen. Ass'y. The Governor signed the bill on August
29, 1975. It became effective in part on November 28, 1975 and in part on January 1, 1976.
101 For a comprehensive analysis of the Act, see Robertson, How the Family Fares: A
Comparison of the Uniform Probate Code and the Ohio Probate Reform Act, 37 Onto ST.
L.J. 321 (1976); OHIO LEGAL CENTER INSTITUTE, REFERENCE MANUAL FOR CONTINUING
LEGAL EDUCATION PROGRAM, vol. 96 (1975).
I Former OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2117.20 (Page 1972). For a discussion of the history
of this section's predecessors, see In re Estate of Hinton, 64 Ohio St. 485, 60 N.E. 621 (1901).
I" Although former OHIO REVISED CODE ANN. § 1.10 (Page 1969) provided that words
of the masculine gender include the feminine gender, the court in State ex rel. Butt v. Petro.
13 Ohio Op. 2d 360, 161 N.E.2d 428 (C.P. Cuyahoga Cty. 1959) held that the converse was
not true and declined to extend widow's benefits to a widower. Section 1.10 was recently
replaced by OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1.43 (Page Supp. 1975) which states: "Words of one
gender include the other genders."
"I The addition of this condition changed the prior law, which permitted all children of
the deceased to obtain the allowance. In re Estate of Hinton, 64 Ohio St. 485, 60 N.E. 621
(1901). The "father's primary duty" is derived from OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3103.03 (Page
Supp. 1975).
" The widow allowance was originally instituted in 1840. See In re Estate of Hinton.
64 Ohio St. 485, 60 N.E. 621 (1901).
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to the changing circumstances of the past century and a half, how-
ever, opportunities for women have become more available and the
rationale behind this distinction is no longer compelling."2 The exist-
ence of insurance, pensions, and trusts-none of which are subject to
probate-has also helped to alleviate the hardship." 3
The legislature eliminated the sex bias of the widow's allowance
by making a similar allowance available to all surviving spouses and
children."' This allowance is not conditioned on financial need nor
on the sex of the deceased or the surviving spouse. It is now called
an "allowance for support" and the amount is set at $5000 rather than
12 months' support. Six other sections of the Code were amended to
reflect the new sex-neutral name of this allowance."'
The revisions in the inheritance laws of intestate succession are
relevant to this article because women have been greatly disadvan-
taged by the failure under prior law to recognize the contributions of
the surviving spouse to the decedent's accumulation of wealth during
his lifetime."' The Probate Reform Act increases the elective share
of the surviving spouse. If there are no surviving children, or their
lineal descendants, the spouse receives the entire estate;" 7 under prior
law the-spouse obtained only three-fourths of this amount. If there is
only one surviving child, the spouse receives the first $30,000 (or
$10,000 if the spouse is not the natural or adoptive parent), plus one-
half of the remainder of the estate."8 If there is more than one surviv-
ing child, the spouse receives the first $30,000 (or $10,000) plus one-
third of the remainder of the estate."9 The initial $10,000 or $30,000
allotment to the spouse when there are surviving children did not exist
under the old statute of descent and distribution.
Another impediment to spousal inheritance, the "half and half"
2 Today approximately one-half of all married women work. The passage of the Civil
Rights Act prohibiting sex discrimination in employment has expanded the opportunities avail-
able. See section I supra.
" See Hoffheimer, Release from Administration Allowances, OHIO LEGAL CENTER IN-
STITUTE REFERENCE MANUAL FOR CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION PROGRAM, vol. 96 (1975).
"I OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2117.20 (Page Supp. 1975). This revision is similar to the
approach of UNIFORM PROBATE CODE §§ 2-402, 2-404. It is also consistent with the recommen-
dations of the Ohio ERA Task Force. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 6, at 36.
"I OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2107.42, 2127.02, 2127.03, 2127.31, 4731.37, 5731.15 (Page
Supp. 1975).
"I For a discussion of the tradition of ignoring this contribution, see Warren, The Hts-
band's Right to Wife's Services, 38 HARV. L. REV. 421 (1925); Krauskopf and Thomas.
Partnership Marriage: The Solution to an Ineffective and Inequitable Law of Support, 35 Oluo
ST. L.J. 558, 580-84 (1974).
HI lo REV. CODE ANN. § 2105.06(D) (Page Supp. 1975).
"' Id. § 2105.06(B).
I d. § 2105.06(C).
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statute,2 0 was repealed by the Probate Reform Act. This statute was
a lingering vestige of the distinction between ancestral and nonances-
tral property. As one commentator has explained, the statute gener-
ally provided that:
(1) If the decedent was the survivor of a first marriage and his or
her first spouse died leaving children, and the surviving spouse of
the first marriage received real or personal property from the first
spouse by deed of gift, devise, bequest, descent or election, and (2)
if the surviving spouse of the first marriage subsequently remarried,
and later dies intestate without issue, at the time of his or her death
possessing real or personal property identical to that received from
his or her first deceased spouse, (3) the "half and half" statute
provides that under these circumstances only one-half of such ident-
ical real or personal property shall pass to and vest in the surviving
spouse of the second marriage, the other one-half to pass and vest
in the children of the first spouse from whom such property came,
or their lineal descendants per stirpes.'2 '
The "half and half" statute was originally designed to keep certain
property within the family of the deceased, and had been considered
an archaic provision for some time.'
The bill also facilitated the inheritance of surviving spouses by
removing the requirement of an executor's bond when the spouse is
the sole heir, 23 and by facilitating the purchase of the mansion
house 4 and transfer of the title of one car owned by the deceased.2 5
Also eliminated from the code by the bill were all references to
bastards and bastardy proceedings. These terms were supplanted by
the terms "out of wedlock" children and "paternity proceedings,"
respectively . 2  This revision was designed to remove some of the
stigma that had formerly fallen disproportionately hard on the
mother and child. The bill also made it easier for a natural father to
establish a legal parental relationship with a child born out of wed-
lock, by eliminating the requirement that a father who marries the
mother before or after the birth of a child out of wedlock must
I" Former OIlo REV. CODE ANN. § 2105.10 (Page 1968). For further discussion of this
statute, see White, Ohio's "Half and Half' Inheritance Statute, 15 U. CIN. L. REv. 401 (1941).
121 Kaufman, supra note 104, at 438.
"I In 1932 a Probate Code Commission recommended its elimination. On numerous
occasions since that time attempts have been made to repeal this section. OHIo REv. Comi:
ANN. § 2105.01 (Page 1968), enacted in 1932, eliminated the distinction between ancestral and
nonancestral property.
' OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2109.07 (Page Supp. 1975).
124 Id. § 2105.062.
I- Id. § 2113.532.
'2' OHio REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1907.181, 2105.17, 2105.18, 2301.03, 3107.06, 3111.01,
3111.16, 3111.17, 3111.20 (Page Supp. 1975).
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formally acknowledge the child to legitimize it; now marriage of the
parents alone is sufficient.12 Although these revisions somewhat sof-
ten the impact of the sex-discriminatory illegitimacy laws, which base
legal parental relationship on the sex of the parent, they are but a
beginning of the reform needed in this area. 2 8
VI. MISCELLANEOUS CHANGES
A. Library Board
Prior to recent amendment, Revised Code § 3375.12 made the
following impermissible distinction on the basis of sex:
[T]he erection and equipment and the custody, control, and admin-
istration of free public libraries established by municipal corpora-
tions shall be vested in a board of library trustees composed of six
members, not more than three of whom shall belong to the same
political party and not more than three of whom shall be women.,,
Since this provision does not place a parallel restriction on male
membership, the Ohio Task Force recommended that it be amended
to delete the stipulation that not more than three members of the
board could be women. This recommendation was accomplished by
the passage of House Bill 796,130 in which the only provision was the
deletion of the objectionable phrase.
'2 A legitimized child has the same legal relationship to the father as a child born during
a marriage.
"2 Historically, the purpose of the concept of illegitimacy was to discourage illicit sexual
relations by making the offspring of such relations socially and legally disfavored. The concept
is discriminatory, because the legal treatment of parent-child relationships is based solely on
the sex of the parent. The rights and duties running between the father and the illegitimate child
are substantially less than those between the mother and the child. Under present law, a child
born out of wedlock has no rights of inheritance against the father's estate, although § 2105.17
does give the child such rights against the mother's estate. Under § 3111.17, the out-of-wedlock
child has no right to support from the father unless a successful paternity proceeding has been
brought. The mother's duty to support is automatic. The father of the child has very limited
parental rights with respect to his child, while the mother's rights are total.
The concept of illegitimacy is particularly offensive because it ignores the most important
factor: parentage. Instead of focusing on paternity and maternity, parentage looks beyond the
legal constructs of marriage and acknowledgment. A child can only be legitimate if the child
bears a prescribed relationship with the father, in addition to the blood-relationship. OHio REV.
CODE ANN. § 2105.18 (Page Supp. 1975). Children are never deemed "illegitimate" based on
their relationship to the mother. Further, only the father holds the power to legitimate a child:
the establishment of paternity for the purpose of determining the duty of support does not have
the legal effect of legitimating the child. See generally OHio REv. CODE ANN. ch. 3111 (Page
1972), as amended, (Page Supp. 1975). See also TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 6, at 15.
The Uniform Parentage Act (1973) could serve as a model in eliminating many of the objection-
able provisions.
"' Former Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 3375.12 (Page 1972).
11 H.B. 796, 11 Ith Ohio Gen. Ass'y, I PAGE'S LEGISLATiVE BULL. 16 (1976).
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B. Equalization of Youth Commitment
One of the obvious examples of sex discrimination was found in
§ 5139.05 of the Revised Code,"' in which a distinction was made
on the basis of sex in the age at which the Ohio Youth Commission
took jurisdiction over a juvenile. The Commission was authorized to
take permanent custody of delinquent males between the ages of 10
and 21 and of females between 12 and 21. The Task Force recom-
mended that this section be amended so that both boys and girls may
be committed to the Ohio Youth Commission at age 12. This recom-
mendation was put into effect by the enactment of House Bill 839.132
C. Insurance
Senate Bill 42511 has amended the Ohio law of unfair and
deceptive insurance practices '34 to prohibit sex discrimination in in-
surance. The bill was signed on June 1, 1976, and became effective
August 31, 1976.
The problems of sex discrimination in insurance can be classified
into four major areas: (1) unequal availability of insurance coverage,
(2) unequal policy terms, (3) unfair rating, and (4) unfair under-
writing practices. Senate Bill 425 deals with each of these problem
areas in amending the Unfair and Deceptive Practices Act. It
includes the following as unfair and deceptive practices: refusing to
issue, cancelling, or declining to renew any insurance policy because
of marital status or sex; making or permitting any unfair discrimina-
tion between individuals of the same class and essentially the same
hazard in rates, benefits, underwriting standards, or any term or
condition of any insurance policy other than life; refusing to make
available disability income insurance solely because the applicant's
principal occupation is that of managing a household; and refusing,
when offering maternity benefits, to make those benefits available to
the policyholder for all individuals covered under any comparable
policy to be issued, including family members if the policy otherwise
provides coverage for family members.3 '
VII. CONCLUSION
The changes that have occurred in Ohio law are significant,
particularly in the areas of employment, divorce, credit, probate, and
,=, Former OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5139.05 (Page 1970).
2 H.B. 839, I I1th Ohio Gen. Ass'y.
' Am. Sub. S.B. 425, I I1th Ohio Gen. Ass'y, 4 PAGE'S LEGISLATIVE BuI,.. 283 (1976).
'34 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3901.19-.25 (1971).
I- Id. § 3901.19(L)-(O), 4 PAGE'S LEGISLATIVE BULL. 283 (1976).
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rape. However, there is still much to be done to achieve equality for
the citizens of Ohio. Over one hundred sections of the Ohio Revised
Code still contain blatant gender preferences. Among the rights af-
fected by these sections are choice of occupation and voting. Ohio
citizens are also affected by the inequitable gender-linked laws of
other states and the federal government, which are beyond the control
of their own General Assembly. Although the changes in the status
of women will probably continue in our rapidly changing society, only
a national Equal Rights Amendment can ensure that the changes will
be consistent and permanent.
